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Abstract 
When the Supreme Court discussed the principle of indemnity in Ridgecrest New Zealand 
Ltd v IAG New Zealand Ltd, it referred to it as ‘awkward’ in the context of a replacement 
policy. The application of the indemnity principle in the case raises further questions about 
the nature of the principle in insurance contracts. It is submitted that the indemnity 
principle is currently enforceable not as a legal test or as a policy-based presumption; 
rather, it is applicable mostly because it is presumed the parties intended it to apply. While 
some policy arguments underlying the principle can be made, these are less relevant than 
they once were. The rationales and rules of, exceptions to, and law reform concerning the 
principle are considered in this paper in order to evaluate the status of the principle. 
Conclusions are drawn from analysis of these elements and in light of Ridgecrest and two 
other cases from 2014, one in the Court of Appeal and another in the Supreme Court. 
Key words: Indemnity principle – insurance law – Ridgecrest New Zealand Ltd v IAG New 
Zealand Ltd 
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I Introduction 
The principle of indemnity in insurance law holds that an insured is entitled to receive a 
full indemnity for his or her loss, no more and no less. However, in the aftermath of the 
Canterbury earthquakes, a recent case in the New Zealand Supreme Court has brought the 
nature of the ‘principle’ into doubt. In Ridgecrest NZ Ltd v IAG New Zealand Ltd, the 
insured was able to claim up to the full amount of the sum insured per happening, despite 
being underinsured and not having repaired the damage from earlier losses when the 
insured building became a total loss.1 This paper explores the uncertainties surrounding the 
nature of the principle, particularly in light of the decision in Ridgecrest. While the focus 
in the case is on property insurance and issues arising from multiple earthquakes in close 
succession, the conclusions drawn about the principle are also applicable to indemnity 
insurance more generally.  
Two other cases from 2014 dealing with the indemnity principle and the Canterbury quake 
damage are also considered. First, the Supreme Court case of Tower Insurance Ltd v 
Skyward Aviation 2008 Ltd (Skyward), a decision released a few months after Ridgecrest 
which is confirmatory of the approach in Ridgecrest.2 Also discussed is the decision in 
QBE (International) Insurance Ltd v Wild South Holdings Ltd (OBE International), 
released soon after Ridgecrest, in which the Court of Appeal clearly stated the principle 
‘survived’ Ridgecrest.3 
The question at the heart of this paper is whether the principle of indemnity is truly a legal 
principle at all. Does it operate as a policy-based principle which contracts must be 
interpreted consistently with, or is it simply descriptive of a particular type of contract? In 
other words, do courts have a discretion or perhaps an obligation to interpret contracts to 
be consistent with the principle, or is the concept of a “no more, no less”, full indemnity 
merely applicable where it can be presumed the parties intended it to apply? This paper 
argues the latter appears more likely following Ridgecrest and in a modern context.  
                                                 
1 Ridgecrest NZ Ltd v IAG New Zealand Ltd [2014] NZSC 11, [2015] 1 NZLR 40. 
2 Tower Insurance Ltd v Skyward Aviation 2008 Ltd [2014] NZSC 185, [2015] 1 NZLR 341. 
3 QBE (International) Insurance Ltd v Wild South Holdings Ltd [2014] NZCA 447, 2 NZLR 24.  
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II Indemnity 
A Various Meanings 
The word 'indemnity' has several interlinked meanings in the insurance context. It may 
describe a type of policy, a measure of loss, or the so-called “principle” of indemnity. This 
paper seeks to more accurately assess the scope of the third meaning. Courts may use the 
term ‘indemnity’ without clearly distinguishing which meaning is intended, leading to 
some confusion. For clarity, the first two meanings mentioned are briefly explained below 
before entering into discussion of the principle itself.  
First, 'indemnity' provides a distinction between contracts of indemnity, which provide 
cover for loss suffered, and contracts based on contingencies. ‘Loss suffered’ in itself 
indicates the premise upon which the indemnity principle is based; loss is an essential 
element of indemnity insurance.4 Contingency contracts, in comparison, provide for a 
specified amount of money to be paid when an insured event occurs irrespective of loss 
suffered, for example, life insurance.5 The difference lies principally in the fact that one 
cannot put a price on certain things, like a loss of life, so the insurance received cannot be 
based on pecuniary loss.6 The indemnity principle, unsurprisingly, operates only in the 
context of indemnity policies.  
Secondly, in the case of an insured event occurring under an indemnity contract, policies 
may offer different options for measuring the loss that the insurer is required to secure the 
insured against. 'Indemnity value' is one method of calculating such loss. It 
involves measuring the loss caused directly by assessing the difference between the 
insured’s position immediately before and after the event. This can be contrasted with 
replacement cover, where the amount required to indemnify the insured is calculated based 
on the cost of replacing or reinstating the thing insured, without making deductions for 
depreciation in value (or the increased cost of meeting new building standards in respect 
of property insurance).  
                                                 
4 Robert Merkin and Chris Nicoll (eds) Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance in New Zealand (Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2014) at 1.1.2(9). 
5 See Gould v Curtis [1913] 3 KB 84 (CA) at 95 per Buckley LJ. 
6 At 95. 
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B Scope of the indemnity principle: options 
In the leading 1883 case of Castellain v Preston, the indemnity principle was described as 
‘fundamental’ to insurance, 7 but the current status of the principle is somewhat uncertain. 
The scope of the indemnity principle, it is submitted, lies somewhere along a scale between 
‘legal test’ as a high water-mark, and merely a ‘measure of loss’ at the low water-mark. 
Four definitions are used in this paper as points of reference to help determine where the 
principle fits on the scale.  
a) Legal test 
While the principle is said to be vital to insurance, there is little to suggest it constitutes a 
strict and compulsory legal test. It is not explicitly enshrined in statute,8 and there are 
several exceptions to the principle which clearly demonstrate that it is not compulsory.9 
Few, if any, substantive arguments exist for affording the principle the status of a legal test, 
and this paper does not submit it as a possibility, but it is useful as a point of comparison 
for the other definitions. 
b) Policy-based presumption 
This option is closer to the upper end of the scale, and allows the principle greater scope to 
play a guiding role in interpreting contracts. Professor McGee seems to take this approach, 
stating that the principle is 'properly regarded as a presumption rather than a rule of law', 
and that the presumption may be rebutted by appropriate wording in a policy.10 The effort 
required to rebut such a presumption reflects the policy arguments underlying the principle; 
these arguments indicate the presumption should not be disregarded lightly. 
c) Presumed intention 
This more descriptive approach views the indemnity principle as something that acts to 
prevent the intentions of the parties being frustrated by presuming no more than a full 
indemnity was intended. Not carrying the same weight as a policy-based presumption, this 
option focuses more on the intentions of the parties than policy and is accepted as the most 
likely option by Neil Campbell and Barnaby Stewart in their paper “Prevention of 
                                                 
7 Castellain v Preston (1883) 11 QBD 380 (CA) at 386 per Brett LJ. 
8 Although the Marine Insurance Act 1908 indirectly acknowledges the principle with provisions that 
conform to the requirements of the indemnity principle: see for example ss 33 and 67-69.  
9 See below, II C 3. 
10 Andrew McGee The Modern Law of Insurance (3rd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, London, 2011) at 4.17.  
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Performance in Replacement Cost Insurance – Preventing a Fictional Response”.11 They 
state that the indemnity principle:12 
can be explained either as a matter of presumed intention (this is what the parties mean by 
“indemnity”) or as one of broad policy (the law should not allow insurance contracts to be used 
as a means of improving the insured’s position). 
They go on to suggest that the former is more likely in Commonwealth countries; this 
reasoning is discussed in more detail below.13 
d) Business practice 
This option leaves the indemnity principle as merely descriptive of a common method of 
crafting insurance policies or measuring loss. It has the potential to carry more weight than 
just a measure of loss in that if clearly recognised as common business practice, the courts 
might choose to follow the principle when faced with an ambiguity in a policy. However, 
the discussion in Ridgecrest on the indemnity principle suggests it has more legal substance 
than a method of business practice.   
It is reiterated that these definitions are starting points, not clear cut options; the final 
answer submitted lies somewhere between a policy-based presumption and a presumed 
intention approach. 
C Evaluating the scope of the principle 
In assessing the scope of the indemnity principle, several aspects of the principle are 
considered: the rationales and rules of, exceptions to, and law reform concerning the 
principle. Analysis of these elements provides a framework for exploring the scope of the 
indemnity principle, one that is added to below when the judgment in Ridgecrest is 
considered. 
Despite not being a strict test, the principle does influence and underlie legal rules applied 
to the interpretation of insurance contracts (indeed it is considered the foundation of all 
such rules in Castellain v Preston)14. Nevertheless, several exceptions to the principle 
demonstrate it is by no means compulsory.  Its role in insurance law has also been 
                                                 
11 Neil Campbell and Barnaby Stewart “Prevention of Performance in Replacement Cost Insurance – 
Preventing a Fictional Response” (2002) 10 Otago LR 229. See also Paul Michalik and Christopher Boys 
Insurance Claims in New Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2015) at 5.3, where a similar approach is taken. 
12 At 230. 
13 See below, IV A. 
14 See below, II C 3(a) and II C 4. 
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considered by Parliament during statutory reform.15 These three aspects all provide insights 
into the scope of the principle. 
However, the rationales of the indemnity principle are the key starting point. Understanding 
these rationales and their current relevance is necessary to assess the weight of the policies 
on which a principle that is more akin to a legal test or presumption might be based. The 
extent to which the rationales have become superfluous indicates the extent to which the 
scope of the principle should fall somewhere lower on the scale, towards mere business 
practice. 
1 Rationales 
Three reasons are commonly given as justification for the principle of indemnity: avoiding 
windfalls to the insured, fraud prevention, and ensuring that the contract is not a wagering 
one.  
(a) Avoiding windfall 
Inherent in the notion that an insurance contract should provide no more and no less than 
a full indemnity is the goal of preventing windfalls to either party. This aspect is 
emphasised in Castellain v Preston. Brett LJ, in the English Court of Appeal, declared 
that:16  
The very foundation […] of every rule which has been applied to insurance law is this, namely, 
that the contract of insurance contained in a marine or fire policy is a contract of indemnity, 
and of indemnity only, and that this contract means that the assured, in case of a loss against 
which the policy has been made, shall be fully indemnified, but shall never be more than fully 
indemnified. That is the fundamental principle of insurance, and if ever a proposition is brought 
forward which is at variance with it … that proposition must certainly be wrong.  
This strongly-worded statement intimates the influence the principle has over indemnity 
contracts by denying the validity of any conflicting interpretation. The object of indemnity 
is simply to put the insured in the position they would have been in.17 Similar views were 
expressed by Viscount Finlay in the 1921 case of British & Foreign Insurance Co Ltd v 
Wilson Shipping Co Ltd, where he warned against extending the indemnity principle in that 
                                                 
15 See below, II C 6. 
16 Castellain v Preston, above n 7, at 386 per Brett LJ. 
17 Malcolm Clarke Policies and Perceptions of Insurance Law in the Twenty-first Century (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2005) at 220.  
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it would lead to a situation ‘not in the region of indemnity against loss, but in the region of 
profit-earning.’18 
An example of a New Zealand case where the principle prevented unfair profit by the 
assured is the requirement in Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance of New Zealand Ltd v 
Roberts (Guardian) that the assured account for any amount received that exceeded her 
personal liability for the property insured. 19 The respondent Roberts hired a car from Hertz 
for 16 days, under a contract limiting liability for damage to $100. Roberts entered into an 
insurance contract with the appellant for damage caused to the vehicle. The car suffered 
$6775.20 of damage during the hire period. The insurer sought to limit its liability to 
Roberts’ personal liability of $100; it was argued this was the true indemnity value. 
While the court noted that an insured could insure to protect against the full amount of loss 
or damage, if so they would be required to account for the amount over and above their 
personal liability for the property to the true owner.20 This was therefore not ‘inconsistent 
with the overriding principle that insurance of goods is a contract of indemnity’,21 as the 
insured herself could not profit from the loss.  
An argument against the necessity of the indemnity principle to prevent unfair profit is that 
in most insurance contracts, an interpretation which allowed an insured to profit from a 
loss would be obviously outside the contemplation of the contracting parties, unless an 
appropriate premium was calculated. For example, replacement policies, where premiums 
are calculated based on the possibility of more than an indemnity being received.22 
Therefore, interpretation using ordinary contract principles equally achieves the purpose of 
avoiding unfair profit. The principle under this approach becomes somewhat of a self-
fulfilling prophecy; it applies mostly because the parties expect it to apply, and structure 
their contract accordingly. This would align the principle more closely with the business 
practice definition.  
However, it would be unfair for an insured to obtain more than a full indemnity if a third 
party were consequently detrimentally affected. For example, a bailee whose interest is 
                                                 
18 British & Foreign Insurance Co Ltd v Wilson Shipping Co Ltd [1921] 1 AC 188 (HL). 
19 Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance of New Zealand Ltd v Roberts (1990) 2 NZLR 106 (HC). 
20 At 114. 
21 A Tomlinson (Hauliers) Ltd v Hepburn [1966] 1 ALL ER 418 (HL) at 422 per Lord Reid; cited in Guardian 
Royal Exchange Assurance of New Zealand Ltd v Roberts, above n 23, at 112.  
22 John Lowry and Philip Rawlings Insurance Law Doctrines and Principles (3rd ed, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2011) at 265. 
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limited but who insures for the full value of the item. To the extent that avoiding windfall 
acts to protect the interests of third parties like Hertz and also those of insurers in cases of 
subrogation, the principle probably retains a much more compulsory nature. 23  However, 
while the doctrine of subrogation seeks to vindicate the principle of indemnity,24 the 
principle itself is not necessary to prevent windfall. Subrogation may also be enforced 
through an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment, where not contractually 
arranged for.25 Further, Lord Reid stated that an insured’s accountability to a true owner 
(like Hertz) was that of a trustee in A Tomlinson (Hauliers) Ltd v Hepburn, suggesting 
equity fulfils the same purpose as the principle in this type of situation.26 
(b) Prevention of fraud  
A more persuasive reason for not allowing an insured to profit is fraud prevention. If the 
insured stands to profit following a loss, the incentive to cause loss increases, and the 
motivation to take precautions to avoid loss or damage is diminished. The latter is more 
insidious as it is not in itself fraudulent. If  claims increase (or insurers perceive that they 
have increased), eventually so will premiums, distorting the process of spreading risk 
through insurance, as honest people end up paying for those who are dishonest or 
deliberately careless.27  
Lord Mansfield CJ notes in Godin v London Assurance Co that “the rule was calculated to 
prevent fraud; lest the temptation of gain should occasion unfair and wilful losses.”28 By 
referring to it as a ‘rule’ necessary to discourage wrongdoing, Lord Mansfield raises the 
significance of the principle. However, this statement was made in 1758, and the insurance 
market and commercial world has undoubtedly changed substantially since then, and new 
methods have been adopted to alleviate the threat of fraud. In fact, insurers are required 
under the Insurance (Prudential Supervision) Act 2010 (IPSA) to be subject to an 
appropriate risk management programme.29 The programme must describe the insurer’s 
                                                 
23 In cases of marine insurance, statute makes the situation clear for marine insurance - insurers have an 
automatic right to subrogation under s 79 of the Marine Insurance Act 1908. 
24 Lord Napier v Hunter [1993] AC 713 (HL) at 744. 
25 Malcolm A Clarke The Law of Insurance Contracts (6th ed, Informa Law, London, 2009) at 1022-1025. 
26 A Tomlinson (Hauliers) Ltd v Hepburn, above n 21, at 422 per Lord Reid. 
27 JP Van Niekerk “Fraudulent Insurance Claims” (2000) 12 SA Merc LJ 69 at 71. See also Clarke, above n 
17, at 252-253. 
28 Godin v London Assurance Co (1758) 1 Burrow 489, 97 ER 419 (KB) at 421 per Lord Mansfield CJ.  
29 Insurance (Prudential Supervision) Act 2010, s 73(1).  
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risk assessment process and procedures for identifying and managing risks to financial 
security, including insurance risks.30 
One example of adapting to change concerns the introduction of replacement value 
policies, which offer cover on a new-for-old basis. The insured is able to obtain cover for 
purchase of a new version of the insured subject matter, often allowing for receipt of more 
than a full indemnity, creating an increased moral hazard for insurers.31 Two steps are 
typically taken to manage the moral hazard associated with replacement cost insurance.32 
The first is by placing limitations that require the proceeds of the policy to be spent on 
reinstating the property, and the second is requiring reinstatement to be implemented with 
reasonable despatch.33  
In one sense, the development of such mechanisms illustrates the value of the indemnity 
principle in preventing fraud when replacement value insurance is not offered. If the risk 
of profit justifies special measures to prevent wrongdoing, impliedly they are necessary to 
plug a gap normally filled by the indemnity principle. The Insurance Council of New 
Zealand’s approach to indemnity further supports the argument that fraud prevention is still 
a relevant rationale; it states that if an insured were in a “better position after an insurance 
claim there would be a financial incentive to make claims.”34 
However, there has not been the same resistance to the introduction of replacement value 
policies in Commonwealth jurisdictions that took place in the United States, suggesting 
less importance is placed in New Zealand on the indemnity principle as a method of fraud 
prevention. In the United States, where the principle is considered a ‘matter of public 
policy’, replacement value policies initially required legislative approval.35 In fact, initially 
replacement coverage was only offered where the moral risk was deemed low, for example 
for insuring public utilities, and large manufacturers.36 Campbell and Stewart argue the 
freedom to contract out of the principle in Commonwealth jurisdiction means a presumed 
intention rationalisation of the principle is more likely.37 
                                                 
30 Section 73(2). 
31 Campbell and Stewart, above n 11, at 232. 
32 At 232. 
33 At 232. 
34 “Insurance Concepts” (13 June 2014) Insurance Council of New Zealand <www.icnz.org.nz>. 
35 Campbell and Stewart, above n 11, at 231. 
36 Leo Jordan “What Price Rebuilding? A Look at Replacement Cost Policies” (1990) 19 Brief 17 at 18. 
37 Campbell and Stewart, above n 11, at 231. 
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The development of self-regulation methods through IPSA and in response to the risks 
associated with replacement policies also supports the notion that the indemnity principle 
is now more appropriately deemed a default presumption of intention, and that parties have 
the freedom to make their own assessment of risk and contract accordingly. That is to say, 
the intentions of the parties are more critical to the interpretation of an insurance contract 
than the principle’s role in fraud prevention. The requirements of IPSA indicate that 
insurers have the ability to manage the risk of fraud through other methods if they choose, 
and therefore the indemnity principle is not strictly necessary. 
A counter to this argument is that it is also possible to interpret these changes as meaning 
a presumption that the principle applies may only be rebuttable where the contract shows 
evidence of careful management of the risk of fraud. That is to say, the courts have allowed 
replacement policies and other policies which may allow a profit with little fuss only 
because they believe insurers have taken proper steps to address the risk. This slightly more 
paternal approach aligns more closely with a policy-based conception of the principle, 
placing the need to discourage fraud above contractual intent. 
(c) Wagering contracts 
The High Court of Australia has declared that underlying the indemnity principle is ‘the 
law’s policy not to allow gambling in the form of insurance’.38 Bowen LJ also warned 
against insurance contracts becoming mere ‘speculation for gain’ in Castellain v Preston,39  
and McGee has raised concerns about the extent to which a replacement value policy 
becomes a wagering one by allowing an insured to make a profit.40 This is because while 
an insurance contract usually only protects a pre-existing interest, the potential for profit 
creates a new interest in the outcome, encouraging entering into the contract because of the 
chance for profit. 
However, while wagering contracts remain illegal in other jurisdictions such as Australia 
and England, this rationale has little legal application in New Zealand today. The provision 
in the Insurance Law Reform Act 1985 prohibiting contracts by way of gaming or 
wagering41 was repealed in the Gambling Act 2003,42 although they remain illegal in 
                                                 
38 British Traders Insurance Co Ltd v Monson (1964) 111 CLR 86 (HCA) at 94.  
39 Castellain v Preston, above n 7, at 399 and 401. 
40 McGee, above n 10, at 4.17. 
41 Insurance Law Reform Act 1985, s 7(2)(b). 
42 Gambling Act 2003, s 374. 
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respect of marine insurance.43 This renders the third rationale largely obsolete in New 
Zealand, it is also not the social problem it was when wagering contracts were first made 
illegal.44  
2 Rules  
It was made clear in Castellain v Preston, and is noted by John Lowry and Phillip Rawlings, 
that “the overriding requirement of indemnity can be seen to underlie the rules which 
operate in the event of an insured loss.”45 Some of these rules have already been mentioned, 
for example the doctrine of subrogation and the method of measuring loss by indemnity 
value. Other ‘rules’ include (but are not limited to) the doctrine of merger and the 
distinction between the loss to the insured and rateable value. 
The doctrine of merger holds that where a partial loss is followed by a total loss, unfinished 
repair costs are subsumed in the costs payable for the total loss. It is primarily an issue in 
marine insurance, where further loss may occur before repairs are able to be completed.  
While it was deemed to also be applicable in non-marine insurance in Crystal Imports Ltd 
v Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London,46 the Supreme Court in Ridgecrest decided 
otherwise, although the authors of Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance in New Zealand 
(Colinvaux) raise some doubts about this analysis.47  
Falcon Investments Corporation (NZ) Ltd v State Insurance General Manager is a case 
which demonstrates the distinction between indemnity against the loss to the insured rather 
than for the value of the subject matter. The insured purchased a house, intending to 
demolish it and replace it with flats. While this was being arranged, the house was leased, 
and insured for fire damage. Not long after, the tenant caused damage to the house and 
three days after that, it was damaged beyond repair by fire. The judge determined that in 
the circumstances, the loss to the insured was distinguishable from the value of the house. 
The actual harm suffered was the loss of rent from the house for the 12 months it was to be 
                                                 
43 Marine Insurance Act 1908, s 5. 
44 Michalik and Christopher Boys, above n 11, at 5.2. 
45 Lowry and Rawlings, above n 22, at 264. 
46 Crystal Imports Ltd v Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London [2013] NZHC 3513, (2013) 18 ANZ 
Insurance Cases 61-997. 
47 See IV B below.  
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let before demolition. Deducted from this was the cost of repairing the damage caused by 
the tenants and the saving made in demolition costs as a result of the fire.48   
These rules demonstrate the potential scope of the principle in influencing contract 
interpretation and show it is more than just business practice, but do not go so far as to 
establish it as being of mandatory application, as the exceptions discussed below 
demonstrate. 
3 Exceptions  
Despite Lord Mansfield’s suggestion that any proposition contrary to the principle must be 
incorrect, it is clear the principle can be contracted around or rebutted. Examples of 
situations which are difficult to reconcile with the principle of indemnity include 
replacement value policies and valued policies. Parties may also agree to a sum insured 
that is less than the full value of the subject matter, thus preventing a full indemnity being 
obtained. 
In a 'valued' policy, the value of the property is agreed when forming the contract, which 
may be more or less than the true value of the property.49 In Irving v Manning, Patteson J 
stated that “a policy of assurance is not a perfect contract of indemnity. It must be taken 
with this qualification, that the parties may agree beforehand in estimating the value of the 
subject assured”.50 The authors of Colinvaux suggest the law permits this on the 
understanding that the agreed amount, although not necessarily a perfect indemnity, can be 
regarded as such by reference to the terms of the contract.,51 and a valued policy will be 
valid in the absence of fraud.52 These policies must be distinguished, however, from non-
valued policies, and the construction of the contract must make it clear what is intended. 
The use of the phrase “sum insured” in itself has been held to refer only to a maximum sum 
for liability.53 
Young & Anor. v Commercial Union General Insurance Company Ltd demonstrates how 
it is difficult to rebut the presumption that the indemnity principle applies. It considered 
the application of a policy insuring household contents and personal effects in respect of a 
                                                 
48 Falcon Investments Corporation (NZ) Ltd v State Insurance General Manager [1975] 1 NZLR 520.  
49 Merkin and Nicoll, above n 4, at 8.2.1. 
50 Irving v Manning (1847) I HL Cas 287, 9 ER 766 (QB) at 774-775 per Patteson J. 
51 Merkin and Nicoll, above n 4, at 8.2.1. 
52 Elcock v Thomson [1949] 2 KB 755 (KB) at 760.   
53 Merkin and Nicoll, above n 4, at 8.2.1. 
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sterling silver tea set that was stolen. The policy held that no more than 5% of the total sum 
insured would be paid for any one item (with some exceptions) unless specified. The tea 
set was listed a specified item, with a price beside it of $22,125. A valuation was obtained 
and provided to the insurer to support this price.54 
The Court found that on proper construction of the policy the insurer was only required to 
indemnify the insured for the indemnity value of the tea set when stolen, in this case the 
cost of obtaining a comparable tea set at $6,000. The Court concluded that the specifying 
of the value was only for the purpose of avoiding the 5% limit, and the provision of the 
certificate of value was deemed solely to be intended to advise the insurer of its possible 
liability in order to calculate premiums.55  
The indemnity principle itself is not mentioned in the judgment, but its application is 
evident in the way that the policy is construed. The court’s decision shows a preference for 
measuring loss by indemnity value rather than by a value agreed upon, despite the insured 
being liable to pay premiums calculated based on the specified value of the tea set. The 
case signals a requirement of very clear wording to rebut a presumption that cover will be 
measured according to indemnity value, or actual loss. This could be read as a confirmation 
that policy underlying the principle is paramount, but is probably still compatible with a 
simple assumption that the parties did not contemplate the receipt of more than an 
indemnity. 
The position of replacement value policies in respect of the principle of indemnity is not 
clear. Lowry and Rawlings state firmly that such contracts do not accord with the notion 
of indemnity.56 However, there has been no real resistance in Commonwealth jurisdictions 
to the introduction of such policies, as discussed above and also noted by McGee.57 
Importantly, Lowry and Rawlings also note that although new-for-old policies are 
inconsistent with the principle, the principle is contractual in origin, and is therefore 
variable.58 This justification for exceptions to the principle points toward a conclusion the 
                                                 
54 Young v Commercial Union General Insurance Company Ltd (1988) 5 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-875 
(NZCA). 
55 At 75,514. 
56 Lowry and Rawlings, above n 22, at 265. 
57 McGee, above n 10. 
58 Lowry and Rawlings, above n 22, at 265. 
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principle really is about the presumed intention of the parties and not based on policy 
issues.  
4 Law Reform  
In 1985, the Insurance Law Reform Act was passed. Among other things, it removed the 
requirement for an insurable interest in non-marine insurance.59 The need to prove an 
insurable interest was deemed an ‘unnecessary technicality’ by the Statutes Revision 
Committee, as in indemnity insurance one could only recover when loss was proved.60 
Geoffrey Palmer reiterated this sentiment during the second reading of the bill when he 
noted that the change reflected the “fact that under an indemnity contract an insured person 
only recovers the actual amount he has lost when property is lost or damaged.”61 From this 
it seems likely the Statutes Revision Committee (and Geoffrey Palmer) considered the 
principle to be one of broad policy, although the somewhat brief consideration of its 
relevance does not permit any substantial conclusions. 
5 Conclusions 
The discussion above provides some evidence of how the principle works to ensure the 
plaintiff does not recover more than a full indemnity. However, it is also clear there are 
exceptions to these rules which limit the scope of the principle. Despite this, previous case 
law has demonstrated the need for strong wording to rebut a presumption that the indemnity 
principle applies, and also the way it underlies rules of insurance contract interpretation. 
The utilisation of underlying rationales in justifying these rules further strengthens the 
argument that the indemnity principle has, at least in the past, been considered a principle 
based strongly on policy, one not easily displaced. The necessity of the principle in 
achieving the purposes that supposedly underlie it is doubtful in a contemporary context 
though, making a presumed intention approach more likely.  
III The Canterbury Cases 
On September 4, 2010, a 7.1 magnitude earthquake struck the Canterbury region. Several 
substantial aftershocks followed, including a 6.3 magnitude quake on February 11, 2011, 
which was even more devastating than the original quake. 185 lives were tragically lost, 
                                                 
59 Insurance Law Reform Act 1985, s 7. 
60 (12 June 1985) 463 NZPD 4766. 
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and the road to recovery has been a long one. The total cost of the earthquakes in private 
insurance claims is estimated at NZ$17 billion,62 and insurers had paid out almost NZ$15 
billion in settling claims by May 2015.63 The earthquakes have shaken the New Zealand 
insurance industry. The challenges of reinsurance,64 costly open ended replacement 
policies and numerous protracted disputes over claims (many remain unresolved) are 
among the issues faced.65 The cases discussed below arose within this wider context. 
A Ridgecrest New Zealand Ltd v IAG New Zealand Ltd 
Ridgecrest had insured a building in Christchurch with IAG. The policy provided 
for a maximum coverage of $1,984,000 'per happening'. This cap was to be reset after each 
happening, and cover was either for the loss or damage or estimated cost of repairs or, 
where replacement cover had been agreed, the cost of restoration or replacement if the 
building was damaged beyond repair. The liability cap was much less than the actual value 
of the building, and this was clearly understood by both parties.66  
During the currency of the policy, the building was damaged in the course of four 
earthquakes. After each of the first two earthquakes in 2010, IAG assessed the damage and 
commissioned repairs, but these were only partially completed when the February 2011 
earthquake struck, after which all repair work stopped. There was a further aftershock in 
June 2011, by which point the building was damaged beyond repair (with IAG contending 
the building was a total loss after the February earthquake).67   
The issue for the Supreme Court was whether Ridgecrest was entitled to claim up to the 
liability limit in respect of each happening. Ridgecrest claimed for the full $1,984,000 in 
respect of the destroying earthquake, and for all the losses caused by earlier earthquakes. 
IAG contended that it was only required to pay for repairs actually undertaken in addition 
                                                 
62“Four years on: Insurance and the Canterbury Earthquakes” (February 2015) Vero  
<www.vero.co.nz >. 
63 “Rebuild Statistics: Insurers Settle $15 billion Canterbury Claims” (11 May 2015) Insurance Council of 
New Zealand <www.icnz.org.nz>. 
64 See Rob Merkin “The Christchurch Earthquakes Insurance and Reinsurance Issues” (2012) 12 Canta LR 
119. 
65 Bill Bennett “Christchurch Rebuild: Quakes force policy change” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, 
Auckland, March 25 2014). 
66 Ridgecrest NZ v IAG New Zealand Ltd, above n 1. 
67 At [11]. 
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to the sum for the final earthquake. The High Court and Court of Appeal had both found 
for IAG, although on different grounds.68 
In discussing whether Ridgecrest’s claim was precluded by the indemnity principle, the 
Court held that the principle was not ‘engaged’ as the $1,984,000 cap was not based on, 
and was mutually understood as being less than, the replacement value of the building.69 
The Court stated that the indemnity principle was an ‘awkward’ phrase in respect of 
replacement value policies.70 
The Court found that the policy placed only three limits on the insured’s rights: there could 
be no double counting; each happening gave rise to a separate claim subject to the specified 
limit; and the total of all claims could not exceed the replacement cost of the building.71 
This final limitation was described as a result of the indemnity principle. It was suggested 
the principle might also apply in respect of any separately identifiable building component 
damaged and then destroyed in later events.72  
The Court’s reasoning in the decision focused on the wording of the policy. It construed 
the words ‘per happening’ as meaning cover was reinstated up to the limit after each event, 
the full amount being claimable even for damage not repaired and now unrepairable. The 
claims were not able to be subsumed into the total loss claim for the final earthquake under 
the merger doctrine. However, it was determined that the unrepaired damage was to be 
assessed on an indemnity basis by diminution in value rather than by replacement costs.73 
It then considered whether the claim limit of $1,984,000 should be deemed the replacement 
value of the building under the terms of the policy. The Court determined that an ‘approach 
based firmly on the policy wording as to the resetting of liability limits’ was preferable.74 
The policy in issue was then evaluated, with four factors leading the Court to decide the 
limit was not deemed to be replacement value. They were: 
a) IAG had never presented its case on that basis; 
                                                 
68 Ridgecrest New Zealand Ltd v IAG New Zealand Ltd [2012] NZHC 2954, [2013] Lloyd’s Rep IR 67 
[Ridgecrest (HC)]; Ridgecrest New Zealand Ltd v IAG New Zealand Ltd [2013] NZCA 291, [2013] 3 NZLR 
618. 
69 Ridgecrest NZ Ltd v IAG New Zealand Ltd, above n 1, at [61]. 
70 At [54]. 
71 At [62]. 
72 At [54]. 
73 At [50]-[52]. 
74 At [60].  
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b) It would result in the cap being applied to more than one happening, which would 
be inconsistent with the cap resetting; 
c) Full replacement value would have caused the previous liabilities to be subsumed 
because it would not simply discharge liability for IAG, it would also cover all of 
Ridgecrest’s previous losses, but the $1,984,000 was insufficient to do this; 
d) It would treat the policy as if it were an agreed replacement value one set at 
$1,984,000, when the policy was not structured at all like a valued policy and there 
was no indication in the policy of an intention to set an agreed value – it was 
mutually understood that the cap was not based on and significantly less than the 
true replacement value of the building.75 
B Skyward Aviation 2008 Ltd v Tower Insurance Ltd (Skyward)76 
The Supreme Court decision in Skyward was released a few months after Ridgecrest. It 
both endorses some of the reasoning in Ridgecrest and provides an example of a situation 
where the principle appears applicable, although the Court did not discuss it in detail and 
it was not decisive of the case. 
After their house was damaged beyond economic repair in the Christchurch earthquakes, 
Skyward received a total of $788,000 from various sources. Skyward claimed that a further 
$314,000 would be required to repair the house on the land (this would fix the amount they 
could receive for buying a new house under the policy), with Tower arguing that its liability 
had already been discharged in this respect by the payment it had already made of $166,000 
for house damage.77  
Tower also contended more generally that accepting Skyward’s measure of indemnity 
would be ‘contrary to settled principles of indemnity’, because it would result in Skyward 
recovering approximately $1,100,000 for a property that had a pre-earthquake value of 
approximately $492,000, and was bought for just $450,000 two years prior to the 
earthquakes.78 The Court found for Skyward, and the case certainly seems strange in light 
of the principle: Skyward essentially made a “profit” of just over $600,000 from their loss. 
The Court did not address this aspect of Tower’s argument in detail its judgment, saying 
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the appeal to the principle had ‘little resosnance’, but it did make a few brief references to 
the principle. 
First, the Court reiterated its comment in Ridgecrest that the principle was ‘awkward’ in 
the context of a replacement policy, adding in a footnote that Ridgecrest demonstrated how 
the ‘applicability of the principle is subject to the wording of the policy under 
consideration.’79 This latter statement would seem to be the one that most closely resembles 
the Court’s approach in respect of the principle in the case: the focus was, as in Ridgecrest, 
on the meaning of the policy wording. The Court made reference to Castellain v Preston 
as authority for indemnity as a core principle of insurance,80 but the result suggests it is not 
a principle that will necessarily require courts to seek Lord Mansfield’s perfect indemnity 
when interpreting contracts. 
The court noted that such policies brought with them moral hazards, but described Tower 
as having been content to manage this with certain provisions in its policy. These included 
reinstatement of the house and limiting replacement value recovery to reimbursement for 
expenditure actually incurred by the insured.81 
C QBE (International Insurance) ltd v Wild South Holdings Ltd (QBE)82 
Coming out just two weeks after Ridgecrest, QBE dealt with several preliminary issues 
from three consolidated High Court cases. All three involved policies with full replacement 
cover to a sum insured and annual aggregate with automatic reinstatement of cover after 
loss. In each case, insured commercial buildings had sustained damage in the September 
2010, February 2011 and June 2011 earthquakes. The relevant preliminary question to this 
discussion was whether the marine insurance doctrine of merger applied to material 
damage policies. 
The Court held that Ridgecrest confirmed the doctrine of merger could not apply to non-
marine insurance policies. However, the Court emphasised that this did not prevent the 
insurers from relying on the indemnity principle.83 This is interesting in light of the fact 
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that the insurer, when arguing for the application of merger, stated that they were seeking 
to ensure the application of the principle of indemnity itself.84 
But the Court stated that the concepts were not co-extensive, and that the principle of 
indemnity ‘survived’ Ridgecrest,85 stating that the principle ‘inheres in any contract of 
indemnity’.86 The court stated that under the principle, if the total cost of reinstatement was 
more than the sum insured but the damage from each separate event was less than the sum 
insured, the actual loss would still be recoverable. This was provided the total amount was 
also less than the replacement cost of the building. However, the insured could not claim 
more than was necessary to repair the combined damage after the final event, as this would 
likely be less than the notional cost of repair following each event.87 
This combining of repair costs in line with the principle of indemnity was in order to 
prevent the insured making a profit, be recovering expense that would not actually be 
incurred would allow the insured to “realise a profit from the policy, a result probably not 
intended in a contract of indemnity.”88  
IV The Ongoing Relevance of the Principle 
It is submitted that Ridgecrest signals a change in the status and scope of the principle; its 
so-called ‘fundamental’ nature is less of a factor in interpretation of policies than it 
purportedly was in 1883. This is especially so in New Zealand, a Commonwealth 
jurisdiction, and one where wagering policies are no longer illegal unless they fall into the 
much narrower category of gambling. It is further submitted that the principle now falls 
somewhere closer to presumed intention, although a few arguments for a policy-based 
presumption remain. 
A Presumed Intention or Broad Policy? 
The approach in Ridgecrest is very much based on the unusual89 wording of the policy. 
The crux of the decision was, essentially, the interpretation of the words ‘per happening’ 
and the understanding that the $1,985,000 was never intended to equate to full replacement 
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cover. In light of a result that may seem unsatisfactory for the insurer considering 
Ridgecrest was underinsured, it does appear that the principle had a rather more limited 
role to play in the case.  
This is confirmed by the comment in Skyward that the ‘applicability of the principle is 
subject to the wording of the policy under consideration’.90 This statement can be 
interpreted in two ways. It can be read as merely meaning the principle is a strong 
presumption that may be rebutted by clear wording in the policy. But more probably, it 
treats the principle as reflecting the presumed intention of the parties, therefore easily 
displaced by wording even slightly inconsistent with the principle. This would imply that 
although in Ridgecrest the insured could not recover more than the replacement value of 
the building, an insured may still recover for notional loss rather than actual loss in 
indemnity insurance, if the policy so provides. The Court of Appeal’s emphasis in QBE 
International on profit being ‘a result probably not intended’ in an indemnity contract,91 
rather than calling it undesirable for substantial policy reasons also supports a focus on the 
intentions of the parties. 
The Supreme Court does not comprehensively address the incompatibility between 
replacement coverage and the indemnity principle in the Ridgecrest and Skyward 
judgments, calling the principle ‘awkward’ in the context of replacement coverage but not 
expanding on the point. Campbell and Stewart’s paper is referenced in Skyward when 
noting the principle applied subject to policy wording, suggesting the Supreme Court does 
not disagree with the views espoused in the paper.92 
The Supreme Court’s comments in respect of double counting in Ridgecrest provide further 
support for a presumed intention status for the indemnity principle. The decision addresses 
how double counting is prevented by the principle of indemnity applying more broadly in 
respect of any separately identifiable building element first damaged and then later 
destroyed in successive events.93 When explaining the problem with double counting, 
however, the Court stated ‘such a result would rationally be seen by insurers as unintended’ 
as justification for suggesting the courts ‘endeavour to avoid’ it.94 The emphasis, instead 
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of being based on a policy argument of preventing a profit to the insured, is again on 
interpreting the intentions of the parties. 
B Merger and Unsatisfactory Outcomes  
The authors of Colinvaux have compared the treatment of the principle in both Ridgecrest 
and QBE and found the former wanting. They disagree with the reasoning behind the non-
application of merger in non-marine insurance, submitting that the doctrine should apply 
to both types unless ousted by agreement.95 They found the Court of Appeal’s conclusions 
in QBE International that indemnity could be applied although merger was foreclosed by 
Ridgecrest unconvincing: ‘merger is, after all, no more than an application of the indemnity 
principle in the limited situation where a partial and total loss occur in the same policy 
period.’96 They conclude the Court of Appeal decision was in conflict with the Supreme 
Court on this point, and that the former’s reasoning, being more compatible with the 
principle of indemnity, is preferable.97 It should be noted that Merkin (an editor of 
Colinvaux), writing on behalf of DLA Piper New Zealand, states that the firm believes the 
judgment is restricted to policies mirroring four particular features of the one in 
Ridgecrest.98 However, Michalik and Boys believe it will apply generally.99 
While it is not possible to discuss the merger issue in further depth here, one might draw 
the conclusion that the guaranteed application of the merger doctrine in marine insurance 
gives the principle the effect of a legal test. In contrast, the clear unavailability of the 
doctrine in non-marine insurance following Ridgecrest limits the scope of the principle 
outside of marine insurance.  
C  Current Relevance of the Principle 
There are two substantive points made by the Supreme Court that appear to derive directly 
from the indemnity principle and suggest its future scope. These are two of the three 
limitations on Ridgecrest’s claim: no double counting and no recovery exceeding the 
replacement cost of the building. The Court also acknowledges indemnity as a ‘core 
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principle’ of insurance in Skyward.100 It dedicates a substantial part of the decision to 
considering its application, which is itself an acknowledgement of the principle’s 
relevance. The consideration given to the principle by academics and in numerous other 
cases is further evidence that the principle of indemnity is certainly much more than mere 
business practice.  
 However, it is submitted that the majority of the reasoning and the overall outcome 
indicate that the principle’s influence is strictly limited by the wording of a policy. In this 
sense, the principle, being less based on achieving its original purposes and directed more 
at not frustrating the intentions of the parties, is certainly more akin to a concept which 
describes an assumption of contractual intention rather than an overarching policy-based 
principle. 
The Ridgecrest and Skyward approach is a more focused on policy wording than public 
policy in comparison to previous (especially historical) case law, seemingly content to 
describe the principle as ‘awkward’ in respect of replacement cost insurance. This further 
suggests the principle is not a vital to insurance contracts as was suggested in Castellain v 
Preston. ‘Awkward’ can be read as another way of saying subsidiary to ordinary contract 
law. Paul Michalik and Christopher Boys have also come to this conclusion, interpreting 
the discussion in Skyward as an illustration of how “courts have been alive to the primacy 
to be given to the insurer’s policy promises as overriding any understanding that insurance 
in general gives only an indemnity.”101 
D Is This Approach Anything New? 
It is submitted that the new conception of the principle following Ridgecrest is likely to be 
mostly revelatory rather than revolutionary. While the principle was once deemed a 
fundamental one and is still referred to as such, this has not in the past prevented the courts 
from allowing flexibility for agreed value policies and new-for-old provisions. Situations 
arose following the Canterbury earthquakes that brought novel cases in respect of property 
insurance considering successive losses not repaired before further or total loss. But it does 
not necessarily follow that these decisions that seemingly subvert the principle are creating 
sudden, new change. 
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While older case law like Castellain v Preston and Godin v London Assurance Co seems 
to make the position very clear and base the principle strongly on underlying rationales, 
daring anyone to contradict it, the principle has become somewhat superfluous in relation 
to these purposes. The judgment in Ridgecrest illustrates that a result obviously unintended 
by either party is to be avoided, yet it may be in most cases that it is very obvious neither 
party intended a result at odds with the indemnity principle; in essence it may simply 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
A presumed intention approach allows more freedom of contract and accordingly is likely 
to better fulfil the intentions of the parties. Perhaps what the principle has done is create an 
attractive method for parties to utilise in the assessment of loss after an event, one that aids 
in understanding the meaning of loss. However, as replacement value insurance, agreed 
value policies, IPSA and Ridgecrest demonstrate, parties are perfectly capable of agreeing 
to distribute risk according to their own preference and contracting out of the principle. 
Perhaps what is needed now is to recognise that the principle merely provides a set of rules 
that one may contract into, although it will be presumably still apply in cases of any 
ambiguity. Insurance Claims – come to the same conclusion. It is possible that these 
decisions, in making such change more evident, will precipitate further change. In other 
words, the Ridgecrest and Skyward decisions may both reflect and instigate changes in 
thinking; yet another a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
In terms of addressing any new issues of moral hazard perhaps arising from a principle of 
indemnity that is focused more on presumed intention, it seems reasonable to assume that 
where a profit is contemplated or at least possible, insurers will have the foresight to include 
provisions to mitigate their risk (and indeed they are required to address such issues under 
IPSA). The cases following the Canterbury earthquakes provided examples of new 
situations to be considered and accordingly addressed if insurers find it necessary. For 
example, insurers now offer sum insured replacement policies in property insurance instead 
of open ended policies.102 A principle that is more obviously restricted is a consideration 
insurers can take into account when writing insurance policies, and the precautions taken 
in respect of replacement insurance might easily be applied to other policies. 
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Another possibility, however, is a potential return to treating the principle in a broad policy 
sense as a counter to what may be seen by some as an undesirable direction for the law. As 
discussed, one expert in conjunction with a major insurance law firm, has already taken the 
approach that the case ought to be confined to the specific and unusual wording of the 
policy at issue. A broad policy-based presumption approach is probably still a workable 
interpretation following Ridgecrest and Skyward; it still allows room for acknowledgement 
of the terms of the policy.  
It is this author’s opinion that the willingness of the courts, insurers and insureds to adapt 
where required suggests the ‘change’ may be a more permanent one though. For example, 
the introduction of replacement value policies, which are more attractive to the market. 
Indemnity value simply does not always adequately address the needs and desires of an 
insured. Insurers have adapted to meet market demand, and addressed their risk 
accordingly. Surely recognition of the new conception is appropriate in a modern context, 
rather than clinging to strict principles developed hundreds of years ago in a different 
commercial environment. This author believes that what is paramount now is not whether 
the principle is based on policy or presumed intention, but that its status is made clear to 
contracting parties. Greater certainty is desirable; it provides parties with the ability to 
better manage their risk. 
V Conclusion 
Indemnity is ‘fundamental’ to insurance; one cannot receive more than a full indemnity; 
the principle prevents recovery of more than an indemnity. These phrases and their like are 
often repeated, perhaps at risk of sounding hollow, without clarification of their meaning. 
In Ridgecrest and Skyward, the purposes underlying the principle were not as important as 
the wording of the policy itself, and indeed some of those underlying purposes can now be 
achieved through other methods, if they are not almost obsolete already. The approach 
taken towards the principle by the Supreme Court suggests it is in fact not that contentious 
for parties to contract out of the principle if they so desire. An understanding that the 
principle is contractual in origin necessitates that the contractual intention of the parties 
will take priority over any notion of a general indemnity principle. The principle is still 
relevant under this presumption of intention approach though; it will apply where the policy 
does not contradict it and in cases of ambiguity. What is important now is that this is made 
clear to insurers and insureds alike, that they may be fully informed when contracting. 
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